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This paper examines the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by demand
deposit contracts and equity contracts. It is shown that in a framework in which indi-
viduals have smooth preferences and there exists some type of aggregate uncertainty
(interest rate risk), the allocations obtained with a financial intermediary allow in
general for greater risk sharing than those achieved in an equity economy. How-
ever, the interest rate is essential in order to determine the superiority of demand
deposit contracts over equity contracts. The results of the paper contradict the ones
obtained by Jacklin [1987] and Hellwig [1994], where demand deposit and equity
contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern financial intermediation literature has focused on modeling bank
runs and on measures to prevent them (see Bryant [1980] or Diamond and
Dybvig [1983] among others). The key feature of these models is that financial
intermediaries, by issuing demand deposits, provide insurance to individuals
that are uncertain about their liquidity needs. However, the demand deposit
contract, providing this risk sharing, has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank
run), in which all depositors withdraw immediately. Bank runs cause real eco-
nomic problems and can be prevented with different intervention measures.
Although the focus of the above papers was bank runs, they also identified
the demand deposit as a vehicle that facilitates risk sharing. Building on this
idea, another branch of literature has analyzed the different degrees of risk
sharing provided by demand deposits and traded equity contracts1 (see Jacklin
[1987], Jacklin [1993], Hellwig [1994] and Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988]2).
The purpose of these papers is to see whether financial intermediaries have a
positive role in the economy, by ensuring liquidity needs, or on the contrary,
1 Traded equity contracts refer to the allocations achieved in a Walrasian market in which
individuals hold the assets directly.
2 These models of intertemporal liquidity risk have been recently extended to compare
banks versus markets, in a dynamic framework (see Fulghieri and Rovelli [1999], Dutta and
Kapur [1994], Bhattacharya and Padilla [1996] and Bhattacharya, Fulghieri and Rovelli [1998]
as examples of such work).
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these same services can be provided by other non-financial intermediaries with-
out the risk of bank runs.
As Jacklin [1987] noted, the Diamond-Dybvig specification, with corner
preferences, riskless assets and no aggregate uncertainty, has the feature that
demand deposit and equity contracts provide the same risk sharing opportuni-
ties. This rules out a positive role for a financial intermediary in the economy.
Hellwig [1994] confirms this result in a model similar to the Diamond-Dybvig
one, but in which there exists a stochastic technology between dates 1 and 2,
interpreted as technology-induced interest rate risk. This risk poses an impor-
tant problem for all financial institutions which, in order to create liquidity, take
in short term deposits and invest in long term assets. The paper focuses on how
interest rate risk should be shared among agents in the economy and how it
is related with the provision of liquidity. In a later paper, Jacklin [1993] shows
that unless there is both aggregate uncertainty about preferences and banks
assets are risky, with depositors asymmetrically informed about asset quality,
then traded equity contracts again provide the same services as demand deposit
contracts, without the possibility of panics. The message of his paper is that liq-
uidity transformation can and should be provided using equity contracts where
the underlying assets may or not be risky, but where there is little or no poten-
tial for asymmetries of information about asset quality. The above papers con-
sidered models in which individuals have corner utility functions, that are not
considered a realistic characterization of individuals’ preferences. With smooth
preferences and no aggregate uncertainty, Jacklin [1987] has shown that non
traded demand deposit contracts and traded equity are not welfare equivalent.
In fact, demand deposits are shown to provide greater risk sharing than equity
shares. Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988] also considered the relative degree
of risk sharing provided by traded and non traded contracts, in a framework
in which bank assets are risky, and individuals (with smooth preferences) are
informed about bank asset quality. The basic result is that deposit contracts
tend to be better for financing low risk assets. However, neither of the two
models considers interest rate risk.
This paper intends to cover one gap in this recent theory. It considers a
framework in which individuals have smooth preferences and in which there is
a random short term investment opportunity from date 1 to date 2, which is
interpreted as interest rate risk (as in Hellwig [1994]). The paper shows that in
this more general framework, demand deposits allow for greater risk sharing
than traded equity, if the interest rate is below a limit value. Otherwise, both
solutions coincide. This limit value depends on the level of risk aversion in the
population, the long and short term asset returns.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model
is presented in Section II. This section characterizes the efficient allocation of
interest rate risk and its interdependence with liquidity provision, under differ-
ent information assumptions. As shown by Jacklin [1987], the demand deposit
contract can be used to achieve the social optimum constrained by incentive
2
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compatibility. Section III compares the second best allocation (demand deposit
contract or non traded solution) with the allocations achieved in an equity econ-
omy in which individuals hold the assets directly (traded solution). An analytical
example is provided in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
There is an economy going through a sequence of three periods (T = 012),
and one good per period, which may be used for investment as well as con-
sumption. There are three investment opportunities:
• A short term asset at T = 0 that yields a sure return bo1 at T = 1.
• A long term asset at T = 0 that yields a sure return bo2 at T = 2, pre-
mature liquidation of the asset is feasible but the rate of return is only
b1 < bo1.
• A short term asset at T = 1 that yields a random return b˜12 ≥ 1 at T = 2.
The random variable is known at T = 1. At T = 0, only the probability
distribution is known.3
On the household side of the economy, there is a continuum of unit mass
of ex ante identical consumers. These individuals are endowed with one unit
of the consumption good at T = 0 and are uncertain about their future time
preferences. They are subject at T = 1 to a privately observed uninsurable risk
of being of type 1 with probability t or of type 2 with probability 1− t.
Their preferences will be represented by an additive utility function which is
of the form:
Uic1i c2i i= i
c1−1i
1− + 1−i
c1−2i
1− (1)
where: 0≤ 2 ≤ 1 ≤ 1 , i = 12 (type), and  > 1 .
It is assumed a more general preference structure with respect to
Hellwig [1994] as individuals derive utility from consumption in both periods,
with type 1 agents deriving relatively more utility from consumption in the first
period with respect to type 2 agents.
It is also assumed no aggregate uncertainty, so that with probability one a
fraction t of consumers are of type 1 and a fraction 1− t of type 2.
Finally, it is assumed b1b˜12 < bo2, for each possible realization of b˜12, that is,
at date 1 it is never desirable to liquidate the long term investment in order to
make room for new short term ones.
3 For simplicity, a triangular distribution for the random return is assumed. The use of this
distribution, defined by its mean and standard deviation, does not affect the qualitative nature
of the results with respect to Hellwig.
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The economy must deal with the following allocation problem:
• At T = 0 the initial endowment must be divided between short and long
term investments (ko = ko1+ko2)
• At T = 1 the fraction (0 ≤  ≤ 1) of the long term investment that is
liquidated must be determined, this may depend on the observed value
of b˜12.
• At T = 1 the returns from short term assets and possibly liquidated long
term investments must be divided between consumption and new short
term investments, this may also depend on the observed realization of b˜12.
This random short term return (b˜12) can be interpreted as technology-
induced interest rate risk, and is considered an important source of risk in an
economy (see Hellwig [1994] for a discussion of the problem of interest rate
risk). This random return plays a crucial role in characterizing the optimal allo-
cation. As already mentioned in the introduction, this paper characterizes the
efficient allocation of interest rate risk and its interdependence with the pro-
vision of liquidity. This efficient allocation can be implemented by a financial
intermediary, using a demand deposit contract. The purpose of the paper is to
see whether in this framework the demand deposit allows for greater risk shar-
ing than the allocations achieved in an equity economy. As a benchmark case,
the complete information situation is studied first.
First Best Allocations Under Complete Information
In the complete information case, it is assumed the type of the consumer is
publicly observable and in this situation the efficient allocation will be the solu-
tion to the following problem:
max
c˜ij ko1ko2˜
EtUc˜11 c˜211+ 1− tUc˜12 c˜222	 (2)
s
t
 ko1+ko2 = ko = 1
c˜11+ 1− tc˜12 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
tc˜21+ 1− tc˜22 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜11− 1− tc˜12	
˜≤ 1
c˜ij ≥ 0
˜≥ 0
ko1 ≥ 0
ko2 ≥ 0
(3)
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The utility function is the one described in equation [1]. c˜11 c˜21 represents
the prior plan indicating the consumption bundle allocated to type 1 consumers
and c˜12 c˜22 the plan allocated to type 2 consumers. The feasibility constraints
are the second and third constraints respectively. The second one requires that
aggregate consumption at T = 1 should be less or equal to aggregate resources
per capita available from short term investments and possibly liquidated long
term ones. Similarly, the third constraint requires that aggregate consumption
at T = 2 should be covered by non liquidated long term investments plus short
term re-investments of unused resources at T = 1.4
This maximization problem is solved as a two-step problem:
• In a first step, the initial investment choices, ko1ko2 are considered as
exogenous parameters and the optimal consumption levels and liquida-
tion policy are determined.
• In a second step the indirect utility function derived in the first step
is maximized on ko1 and ko2, and so the optimal levels of the initial
investments are obtained.
The solution to the first best problem gives the main result of the section,
expressed by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let k∗o1k
∗
o2 c
∗
11 c
∗
12 c
∗
21 c
∗
22
∗ be a solution to the first
best problem and define:
blim =
{
bo1ko1
[
t+ 1− t( 2
1
)−1/]
bo2ko2
[
t+ 1− t( 1
2
)−1/]
}−
1
1−1
(4)
if b˜12 < blim: CASE A
c˜∗11 =
bo1ko1
t+ 1− t
[
1
2
]−1/ c˜∗21 = bo2ko2
t+ 1− t
[
2
1
]−1/ (5)
c˜∗12 =
[
1
2
]−1/
c˜∗11 c˜
∗
22 =
[
2
1
]−1/
c˜∗21 (6)
4 Given the observed realization of the short term return, b˜12, the decision between con-
sumption and re-investment in this new short term asset takes place. If there is no re-
investment, the first resource constraint would be satisfied as an equality. The constraints
would then become:
tc˜11+ 1− tc˜12 = bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
tc˜21+ 1− tc˜22 = bo21− ˜ko2
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if b˜12 ≥ blim: CASE B
c˜∗12 =
[
1
2
]−1/
c˜∗11c˜
∗
11 =
[
2
1
b˜12
]−1/
c˜∗21 (7)
c˜∗21 =
bo1ko1b˜12+bo2ko2
t
[
1+
(
2
1
)−1/ + b˜ −112
]
+ 1− t
[(
2
1
)−1/ +b −112
] c˜∗22 =
[
2
1
]−1/
c˜∗21
(8)
and ∗ = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Given that ko1 is an endogenous variable, this characterization may seem
awkward, but it is understood in terms of dynamic programming considerations.
As mentioned before, the maximization problem given by equations [2] and [3]
has been solved as a two step problem: In the first step, ko1 and ko2 were con-
sidered as exogenous parameters and the optimal consumption levels were
obtained. In the second step, the optimal levels of the initial investments were
derived, maximizing on ko1 and ko2 the indirect utility function of the first step
problem, that is, the optimal levels of ko1 and ko2 are obtained as a solution to
the following problem:
max
ko1ko2
[∫ blim
bmin
U ∗Af b12db12+
∫ bmax
blim
U ∗Bf b12db12
]
(9)
s.t: ko1+ko2 = ko (10)
The consumption levels are the ones specified in Proposition 1. It is observed
that for low values of the random return, and up to a limit value blim, con-
sumption is independent of b˜12, but once this limit value is achieved, consumption
depends on the random return: first period consumption decreases, second period
consumption increases with b˜12. In mathematical terms, this means that for low
values of the random return, the first resource constraint is binding, and there-
fore consumption is constant, and once the limit value is attained, the constraint
is no longer binding, and therefore consumption depends on b˜12. The intuition
for this result is that given the high value of the random return, it becomes
advantageous to reinvest some of the return available from the short term asset
at T = 1 bo1ko1, in the new short term technology. From an ex ante point of
view, the uncertainty about the random return is seen as a source of opportuni-
ties rather than a threat. The optimal allocation implies reducing consumption
of individuals at date 1 and increasing it at date 2, in order to take advantage of
the high return. While long term investments are earmarked for consumption
6
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Figure 1: Optimal consumption levels in the first best allocation
at date 2, short term investments are not necessarily earmarked for consump-
tion at date 1, and therefore, the choice between consumption and investment
depends on the rate of return b˜12 on the new short term investments.
Finally, given the condition b1 < bo1, it can be easily shown that liquidation
of the long term investment is always zero in the first best allocation ∗ = 0.
Numerical Simulations
Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption levels, in the first best case. The data
used in the simulations are given in Table 1. The graph plots consumption for
type 1 c˜11 c˜21 and type 2 c˜12 c˜22 agents for different values of the random
return. It is observed that as interest rate increases, first period consumption
decreases, and second period consumption increases.
Table 1: Input data for the numerical simulations for Figure 1 to Figure 7.
t 1 2  bo1 bo2 b1 Eb12
0.50 0.60 0.40 2.00 1.30 1.70 1.00 1
22−0
05
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Second Best Allocations under Incomplete Information
In this case it is assumed that the realization of the timing of the consumption
needs is private information of the consumer. Given this information asymme-
try, an allocation can only be implemented if it is incentive compatible, that is, if
it gives no consumer an incentive to lie or deviate about what he actually wants
to consume. In the case of a type 2 agent, incentive compatibility requires that
the utility obtained from the consumption bundle he receives if he is honest
c˜12 c˜22, should be at least as large as the utility obtained by lying and behav-
ing like a type 1 agent, that is, obtaining the consumption bundle c˜11 c˜21 and
then reinvesting his first period consumption in the backyard technology in the
optimal way for him. If he reinvested part of his first period allocation c˜11 in
the new short term asset, his optimal consumption levels in both periods c˜∗1 c˜
∗
2
are the solution to the following problem:
max
c˜1c˜2
{
2
c˜1−1
1− + 1−2
c˜1−2
1−
}
(11)
s.t c˜1 ≤ c˜11
c˜2 = c˜11− c˜1b˜12+ c˜21
(12)
which yields:
c˜
∗2
1 =
[(
1−2
2
)
b˜12
]−1/
c˜∗2 ≤ c˜11 c˜∗22 =
c˜21+ c˜11b˜12
1+ b˜
−1

12
(
1−2
2
)−1/ (13)
The incentive compatibility constraint for a type-2 agent is then:
2
c˜1−12
1− + 1−2
c˜1−22
1− ≥ 2
c
∗2
1
1−
1− + 1−2
c
∗2
2
1−
1− (14)
The incentive constraint for a type-1 agent is obtained in a similar way, and
would be:
1
c˜1−11
1− + 1−1
c˜1−21
1− ≥ 1
c
∗1
1
1−
1− + 1−1
c
∗1
2
1−
1− (15)
where:
c˜
∗1
1 =
[(
1−1
1
)
b˜12
]−1/
c˜∗2 ≤ c˜12 c˜∗12 =
c˜22+ c˜12b˜12
1+ b˜
−1

12
(
1−1
1
)−1/ (16)
In deriving these incentive compatibility constraints, it is assumed (as in
Hellwig [1994]) that they are specified as purely technology-based constraints,
8
Banks Increase Welfare 211
and without individuals having access to some set of markets on which they can
trade among them.5 Taking the incentive constraints into account, the second
best problem is a solution to the following one:
max
c˜ij  ko1ko2 ˜
EtUc˜11 c˜211+ 1− tUc˜12 c˜222	 (17)
s.t ko1+ko2 = ko = 1
tc˜11+ 1− tc˜12 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
tc˜21+ 1− tc˜22 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜111− tc˜12	
˜≤ 1
c˜ij ≥ 0 (18)
˜≥ 0
ko1 ≥ 0
ko2 ≥ 0
I.C. Constraints
Numerical Simulations
The analytical treatment of the second best solution is quite a tedious one,
therefore numerical solutions have been computed, for the data shown in Table
1.6 As in the first best case, the problem is solved in two steps. A graphical
plot of the optimal solution is given by Figure 2. As in the first best case, the
random return plays a crucial role in characterizing the second best solution:
first period consumption decreases and second period consumption increases
with the random return. For values of the random return below a specific value
b2 there is no re-investment of resources at date 1, and once this critical value
is attained it becomes advantegous to reinvest some of the return available
at date 1 in the new short term asset. However, in the second best case, a
dependence of first period consumption on b˜12 may be imposed by the incentive
compatibility constraints. In this sensse, it should be mentioned, that in the
optimal solution the incentive constraint for type-1 agents is never binding and
that of type-2 may be binding.7
5 See Section III for a discussion of the coexistence of banks and markets.
6 The FOCS to this problem are shown in Appendix B. These system of non-linear equa-
tions was solved by the Newton Raphson technique, with the use of a computer program, that
was written in MSDos Qbasic.
7 For values of the random return below b1 neither of the constraints bind (case A1) and
consumption is constant. For values of the random return above b1 the incentive constraint
for type 2 agents is binding (cases A2 and B) and consumption will depend on the random
return. It should be mentioned that as in Hellwig’s case a value of  > 1 ensures that the
constraint for type 2 agents binds.
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b12 case c11 c21 c12 c22
1,00 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,02 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,04 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,06 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,08 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,10 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,12 case A1 0,76473 0,71175 0,62440 0,87171
1,14 case A2 0,76436 0,71131 0,62476 0,87215
1,16 case A2 0,76386 0,71071 0,62526 0,87275
1,18 case A2 0,76334 0,71011 0,62578 0,87335
1,20 case A2 0,76282 0,70950 0,62630 0,87395
1,22 case A2 0,76229 0,70890 0,62683 0,87456
1,24 case A2 0,76176 0,70830 0,62736 0,87516
1,26 case A2 0,76122 0,70770 0,62791 0,87576
1,28 case A2 0,76067 0,70710 0,62845 0,87635
1,30 case B 0,75961 0,70716 0,62848 0,87763
1,32 case B 0,75664 0,70979 0,62650 0,88157
1,34 case B 0,75375 0,71242 0,62458 0,88550
1,36 case B 0,75095 0,71504 0,62272 0,88943
1,38 case B 0,74822 0,71767 0,62092 0,89335
1,40 case B 0,74558 0,72030 0,61917 0,89727
1,42 case B 0,74301 0,72293 0,61748 0,90118
1,44 case B 0,74052 0,72555 0,61584 0,90509
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Figure 2: Optimal Consumption Levels in the Second Best Allocation
A financial intermediary could implement the efficient allocation using a
demand deposit contract. Liquidity provision in this case would imply that the
optimal rate of deposits withdrawn at date 1 should decrease and those that
remain until date 2 should increase.
10
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Finally, it should be mentioned that for the parameter values of the analysis,
there is never liquidation of the long term technology8 and that the optimal
levels of the initial investments are derived as in the first best case.
III. COMPARISON WITH AN EQUITY ECONOMY
As mentioned in the introduction, financial institutions provide liquidity, by
transforming illiquid assets into liquid deposits. This gives a role for financial
intermediaries in the economy, although it leaves them vulnerable to bank runs.
The aim of this section is to compare the level of risk sharing achieved with a
demand deposit (ex ante expected utility of the second best allocation calcu-
lated in the previous section) and the level that could be obtained in a com-
petitive market. Let an equity contract be defined as a contract that for each
unit invested at T = 0 returns a two period dividend stream bo1ko1 at T = 1 and
bo2ko2 at T = 2. Implicit in this definition is the existence of a market in ex-
dividend claims at T = 1. Suppose that at T = 1, there was a Walrasian market
for date 1 and date 2 consumption goods and let R2 = 1+ r be some equilib-
rium interest rate at which individuals are willing to trade good 1 in exchange
for good 2, and so that for any agent j , his first period consumption will be the
amount of the date 1 endowment bo1ko1 plus the quantity demanded (or sup-
plied) of good 1 in exchange for good 2, and similarly, in the second period, his
consumption will be the second period endowment bo2ko2 plus the quantity
supplied (or demanded) of good 2 in exchange for good 1. That is:
c1j = bo1ko1+Bj
c2j = bo2ko2−R2Bj j = 12
(19)
where Bj is the quantity demanded (or supplied) of good 1 in exchange for
good 2 and with
∑
j tjBj = 0 across agents determining R2, subject to the caveat
R2 ≥ b12, the short term realized (storage) rate from T = 1 to T = 2. If storage
(with R2 = b12) is done then 0≥
∑
j tjBj ≥−bo1ko1 is the constraint overall.
Individuals maximize their utility functions subject to the above constraints,
that is:
Type-1 problem at T = 1:
max
B1
{
1
c1−11
1− + 1−1
c1−21
1−
}
(20)
s.t: c11 = bo1ko1+B1 (21)
c21 = bo2ko2−R2B1 (22)
8 However, as in Hellwig [1994], the second best allocation may provide for liquidation of
the long term asset.
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with solution:
B1 =
(
1−1
1
R2
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−1
1
R2
)−1/
R2
(23)
Type-2 problem at T = 1:
max
B2
{
2
c1−12
1− + 1−2
c1−22
1−
}
(24)
s.t: c12 = bo1ko1+B2 (25)
c22 = bo2ko2−R2B2 (26)
with solution:
B2 =
(
1−2
2
R2
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−2
2
R2
)−1/
R2
(27)
Two possibilities may be considered:
1. If R2 ≥ b12
From the equilibrium condition
∑
j tjBj = 0, the following non-linear
equation in R2 is obtained, that is:
t
(
1−1
1
R2
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−1
1
R2
)−1/
R2
+ 1− t
(
1−2
2
R2
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−2
2
R2
)−1/
R2
= 0
(28)
The value of R∗2 is obtained as a solution to the above equation, and
from it the values of B∗1 and B
∗
2 are derived. These values are substituted
in the expressions for c11 c21 and c12 c22, to calculate ex ante expected
utility in this economy, or equivalently, the level of risk sharing that can
be achieved in a Walrasian market.
2. If b12 >R2
In this case the equilibrium interest rate is R∗2 = b12, the realized short
term return.
The optimal levels of B∗1 and B
∗
2 are:
B∗1 =
(
1−1
1
b12
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−1
1
b12
)−1/
b12
B∗2 =
(
1−2
2
b12
)−1/
bo2ko2−bo1ko1
1+
(
1−2
2
b12
)−1/
b12
(29)
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and from them, the optimal consumption levels and the value of the
expected utility are obtained. For the parameter values of the exam-
ple, the solution to equation [28] yields R2 = 1
2959. As in Hellwig’s
case,9 this price coincides with the limit value b2 above which there is
re-investment in the new short term asset, in the second best allocation.
As commented above, for values of the random return below 1.2959 the
equilibrium price (of good 1 in exchange for good 2) will be 1.2959 and
otherwise, the equilibrium price in the market will be the realized short
term return. Figure 3 plots the optimal consumption levels in the equity
economy. If we compare these consumption levels with the second best
allocation represented in Figure 2, it can be observed that for values of
the random return below b2 consumption for type 1 agents in both peri-
ods is always higher with the demand deposit contract and consumption
of type 2 agents is higher in the equity economy. For values of the ran-
dom return above b2 both solutions coincide.
In order to compare the expected utility obtained in the second best allo-
cation or non traded solution with respect to the traded one, some numeri-
cal examples have been computed. The input data are those corresponding to
Table 1, where the variations in the exogenous parameters and the results of
these comparisons are shown from Figure 4 to Figure 7.
A general feature to all the examples is that the non traded solution is always
welfare superior for values of the random return below b2. As the random
return increases the difference in utility becomes zero. This means that at least
for low values of b12, the demand deposit contract can accomplish greater risk
sharing than the equity contract. This is explained by the fact that individuals
are being insured against being type 1 to a greater extent than in the traded
case (the stream preferred by type 1 agents represents more wealth than the
stream preferred by type 2).
The intuition for this result can be viewed in terms of individual versus
coalition incentive compatibility. (See Jacklin [1987]). “Since demand deposits
cannot be traded, they can be used to achieve any allocation that is individually
incentive compatible. On the other hand, the allocation achieved in the traded
solution is a competitive equilibrium and thus represents an element in the
core of the economy in which individuals start trading with identical initial
endowments. By definition all elements in the core are not only individually
incentive compatible but also coalitionally incentive compatible (that is, there
does not exist a coalition of individuals each of whom can be made better off
by following a strategy specified by the coalition and then redistributing the
coalition’s total allocation).
In both the demand deposit and equity economies, the same objective func-
tion (i.e., ex ante expected utility) is being maximized but, in the non traded
9 See the analytical example in the next section.
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b12 R*2 c11 c21 c12 c22
1.00 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.02 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.04 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.06 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.08 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.10 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.12 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.14 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.16 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.18 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.20 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.22 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.24 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.26 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.28 1.30 0.76023 0.70663 0.62889 0.87683
1.30 1.30 0.75961 0.70716 0.62848 0.87763
1.32 1.32 0.75664 0.70979 0.62650 0.88157
1.34 1.34 0.75375 0.71242 0.62458 0.88550
1.36 1.36 0.75095 0.71504 0.62272 0.88943
1.38 1.38 0.74822 0.71767 0.62092 0.89335
1.40 1.40 0.74558 0.72030 0.61917 0.89727
1.42 1.42 0.74301 0.72293 0.61748 0.90118
1.44 1.44 0.74052 0.72555 0.61584 0.90509
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Figure 3: Optimal Consumption Levels in the Walrasian Market
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Figure 4: Variation in the Long Term Asset Return
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Figure 6: Variation in the Proportion of Consumers of Type 1 Consumers
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Figure 7: Variation in 
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solution, it is maximized over a less constrained set and therefore demand
deposits can generally achieve greater risk sharing than equity contracts.
However, as mentioned above, the limit value b2 is essential in order to
determine the superiority of demand deposit contracts over equity contracts.
This critical value depends on the exogenous parameters of the model. In
Figure 4, the variation has been carried out with respect to the long term asset
return bo2. If the long term asset return increases, this limit value of the
interest rate above which it becomes optimal to reinvest some of the return
available at date 1 in the new short term asset, also increases. This makes
sense intuitively, given the high value of the long term asset return it is not
so interesting to reinvest the returns available at date 1 in the new short term
asset. Therefore, as bo2 increases, demand deposits are preferred to equity to
a greater extent.10 Figure 5 shows that if risk aversion  increases then the
limit value decreases. For very high values of  the limit value would be so low
that in this case demand deposits and traded contracts would attain the same
level of risk sharing. This may be explained by the reverse-hedging results of
Breeden [1984]. He shows that for the CRRA utility functions if individuals are
sufficiently risk averse they may choose to reverse hedge, that is, they prefer
to consume less now in order to invest in the uncertain future. Figure 6 shows
that the variation in the proportion of type 1 consumers does not influence the
limit value.
Finally, Figure 7 illustrates that in Hellwig’s case  = 1 = 1− 2 = 1
demand deposit and equity contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instru-
ments.
It may be concluded that, if agents have smooth preferences, represented by
an additive utility function, and there is some type of aggregate risk, technology
induced interest rate risk, the allocations obtained in the non traded solution are
welfare superior with respect to the ones achieved in the traded one, if the interest
rate is below a limit value b2. Otherwise, both solutions are equivalent. This limit
value depends on the level of risk aversion in the population, the long and the short
term asset returns.
Finally, one comment should be added regarding the equity versus bank con-
tract comparison. As argued by Jacklin [1987] and Wallace [1988], equity and
bank contracts are not compatible in the same economy, since arbitrage by issu-
ing equity against deposits between periods 1 and 2, would eliminate the kind
of risk sharing offered by banks. One way to motivate banks, is as suggested in
Wallace [1988]: If agents are isolated at date 1, then no asset markets can oper-
ate and bank contracts will survive. However, if this assumption is used to moti-
vate banks in the Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988] framework or in this paper,
then the bank versus equity comparison lacks content. Therefore, the way to
interpret the exercise in this paper (as in Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988]) is
10 Similarly, it could be shown that increasing the short term return bo1 would decrease
the limit value, and hence demand deposits would be preferred to equity to a lower extent.
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that both equity and banking arrangements are feasible, but there is a financial
regulation allowing only one of these arrangements to exist in each case.11 This
comparison between the discussed arrangements can be used for evaluating this
particular kind of government regulation.
IV. AN ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE: HELLWIG’S CASE
The aim of this section is to provide analytical results for a special case, in which
individuals have corner preferences. This means that in the utility function
specification given by equation [1] 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, so that the utility function
can be simplified to:
Uici=
c1−i
1− (30)
where: i= type= 12. In this case type 1 agents derive only utility for consump-
tion at T = 1 whereas type 2 agents derive utility for consumption at T = 2. All
the other assumptions of the model are assumed to remain constant.
We will compare the second best outcome to the allocations achieved in the
equity economy. It will be shown that in this case, demand deposit and equity
contracts are always equivalent risk sharing instruments.
The Second Best Allocation
The second best problem is a solution to the following one:12
max
c˜1c˜2ko1ko2˜
EtUc˜1+ 1− tUc˜2	 (31)
s.t ko1+ko2 = ko
tc˜1 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
1− tc˜2 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜1	
c˜1b˜12 ≤ c˜2
˜≤ 1 (32)
c˜i ≥ 0
˜≥ 0
ko1 ≥ 0
ko2 ≥ 0
11 An interesting addition to this recent literature are the papers by Diamond [1997] and
Von Thadden [1998] that allow for the coexistence of banks and markets.
12 Notice that in this case there is only one incentive constraint, for type 2 agents, given by
c˜1b˜12 ≤ c˜2.
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The solution to the second best problem is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let k∗o1k
∗
o2 c
∗
1 c
∗
2
∗ be a solution to the first best problem
and define:
b¯1 =
[
bo2ko2
1−t
]−
bo2[
bo1ko1
t
]− b∗2 = tbo2ko21− tbo1ko1 b∗∗2 =
[bo2
b1
]1/
(33)
a) If b1 ≤ b¯1: then ∗ = 0
If b12 ≤ b∗2  c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1
t
c˜∗2 =
bo2ko2
1− t (34)
If b12 ≥ b∗2  c˜∗1 =
bo2ko2
b˜12
+bo1ko1 c˜∗2 = c∗1 b˜12 (35)
b) If b1 > b¯1: then ∗ =max0 bo1ko1−tc
∗
1
b1ko2
	
If b12 ≤ b∗∗2  c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1+ko2b1bo2
tbo2+ 1− tb1
[
bo2
b1
]1/ c˜∗2 =
[
bo2
b1
]1/
c∗1 (36)
If b12 ∈ b∗∗2  b∗2 c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1
bo2
b1
+bo2ko2
t
[
bo2
b1
]+ 1− tb˜12 c˜∗2 = b˜12c∗1 (37)
If b12 ≥ b∗12 c˜∗1 =
bo2ko2
b˜12
+bo1ko1 c˜∗2 = c∗1 b˜12 (38)
Proof: See Appendix C.
It can be observed that the second best solution may provide for liquidation
of the long term asset. In fact, if the liquidation value of the long term technol-
ogy is below a limit value b¯1, then, it is never optimal to liquidate the long term
investment, and the consumption levels are those given by lemma 1 (point a).13
Otherwise, if b1 > b¯1, then there may be partial liquidation of the long term
asset and the optimal consumption levels are given by lemma 1 (point b). A
general feature to both cases is that for low values of the random return con-
sumption is constant, independently of b12, and once a limit value is attained
(b∗2 or b
∗∗
2 ) consumption depends on the random return.
13 Similarly, the non-liquidation case could be expressed in terms of ko1, that is, if ko1 ≥
k1 = tbo2
bo11−t
(
b1
bo2
)−1/
+tbo2
, then, it is never optimal to liquidate the long term investment.
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The Equity Economy
Following the definition of Section 3, an equity contract is as a contract that
for each unit invested at T = 0 returns a two period dividend stream bo1ko1 at
T = 1 and bo2ko2 at T = 2. Implicit in this definition is the existence of a market
in ex-dividend claims at T = 1. Let R2 = 1+r be some equilibrium interest rate
at which individuals are willing to trade good 1 in exchange for good 2.
However, with corner preferences, type 1s will always exchange their total
second period endowment (bo2ko2) against bo2ko2/R2 units of the date 1 good.
Similarly, type 2 agents will exchange their first period endowment (bo1ko1)
against bo1ko1R2 units of the date 2 good.
Consumption of type 1 agents at T = 1 will be:
c1 = bo1ko1+
bo2ko2
R2
(39)
Similarly, consumption of type 2 agents at T = 2 will be:
c2 = bo1ko1R2+bo2ko2 (40)
Two possibilities may be considered:
1. If R2 ≥ b˜12
From the market clearing condition tbo2ko2/R2 = 1− tbo1ko1 it is
obtained that R∗2 = tbo2ko21−tbo1ko1 . This price coincides with the limit value
b∗2 of the second best allocation. Substituting this price in equations [39]
and [40] we obtain:
c∗1 =
bo1ko1
t
c∗2 =
bo2ko2
1− t (41)
2. If b˜12 >R2:
In this case the equilibrium interest rate is the realized short term return,
i.e., R∗2 = b˜12 and the optimal consumption levels would be:
c∗1 = bo1ko1+
bo2ko2
b˜12
c∗2 = bo1ko1b˜12+bo2ko2 (42)
It can observed that the optimal consumption levels coincide with the
ones given by lemma 1 (point a): Demand deposit contracts and equity
contracts are equivalent risk sharing instruments.
Finally, it remains to be shown that this is also true when there is partial
liquidation of the long term technology. In this case the first and second period
endowments of individuals would become bo1ko1 + b1ko2 and bo2ko21−
respectively, in order to take into account the possibility of premature liquida-
tion of the long term asset at T = 1.
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Following the same reasoning as in the previous case, type 1 individuals will
completely exchange their second period endowment with type 2, in exchange
for the first period one.
Consumption of type 1 agents at T = 1 will be:
c1 = bo1ko1+b1ko2+
bo2ko21−
R2
(43)
Consumption of type 2 agents at T = 2 will be:
c2 = bo1ko1+b1ko2R2+bo2ko21− (44)
As before two possibilities may be considered:
1. If R2 ≥ b˜12
From the market clearing condition tbo2ko21−/R2 = 1− tbo1ko1+
b1ko2, and substituting the value of  given in lemma 1, it is obtained
that R∗2 =
[
bo2
b1
]1/
. This price coincides with the limit value b∗∗2 of the
second best allocation.
2. If b˜12 >R2
The equilibrium interest rate will be the realized short term return.
Substituting the equilibrium prices in equations [43] and [44] it can also
be shown that we obtain the optimal consumption levels given by lemma
1 (point b).14
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper is to compare the welfare properties of banking arrange-
ments with those where the intertemporal allocation is achieved using equity
contracts. The paper considers a model in which there is a random short term
technology or interest rate risk (as in Hellwig [1994]), and individuals derive
utility for consumption in both periods of their lives. The optimal allocation of
technology-induced interest rate risk can be implemented by a financial inter-
mediary, using a demand deposit contract. The paper shows, using numerical
examples, that the level of risk sharing achieved with a demand deposit con-
tract is in general higher than with an equity contract. This result confirms
14 It should be mentioned that this liquidation case has not been considered in the more
general (smooth preference case) of Section III. However, this would have added an additional
complication into the analysis without changing the essence of the result: the superiority of
demand deposits over equity contracts depends on the limit value of the interest rate.
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the important role financial institutions perform, as providers of liquidity, even
though, in providing this service they may be vulnerable to bank runs.15 How-
ever, the superiority of demand deposits over equity contracts depends on a
critical value of the interest rate: for values of the interest rate below this criti-
cal one, demand deposits accomplish greater risk sharing than equity contracts,
otherwise both solutions coincide. This critical value depends on the level of
risk aversion in the population, the short and the long term asset returns. The
contribution of this paper is to show that with smooth preferences and inter-
est rate risk, this latter variable plays a crucial role in order to determine the
superiority of demand deposits over equity contracts.
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VI. APPENDICES
Appendix A: First Best Allocation
First-step Solution
In the first step, ko1 and ko2 are considered as exogenous parameters and so
the problem to be solved is the following one:
max
cij 
{
t
[
1
c1−11
1− + 1−1
c1−21
1−
]
+ 1− t
[
2
c1−12
1− + 1−2
c1−22
1−
]}
(45)
s.t.
tc11+ 1− tc12 ≤ bo1ko1+ko2b1
tc21+ 1− tc22 = 1−bo2ko2+ ko2b1+bo1ko1− tc11− 1− tc12	b12
cij ≥ 0
 ≥ 0 (46)
 ≤ 1 (47)
The Lagrangian is formed by using the lagrangian multipliers 1 and 2 of
the two first resource constraints.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
t1c
−
11 −1t+ tb122 = 0 if c11 > 0
t1−1c−21 + t2 = 0 if c21 > 0
1− t2c−12 −11− t+ 1− tb122 = 0 if c12 > 0
1− t1−2c−22 + 1− t2 = 0 if c22 > 0
ko2b11−ko2b1b12−bo22−3 = 0 if  > 0
bo1ko1+ko2b1− tc11− 1− tc12 = 0 if 1 > 0
tc21+ 1− tc22− 1−bo2ko2− ko2b1+bo1ko1
−tc11− 1− tc12	b12 = 0 ∀2
1−= 0 if 3 > 0
(48)
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The following cases may be considered:
CASE A: 1 > 0∗ = 0
The equations to be solved are:
1c
−
11 −1+b122 = 0 [a] 1−1c−21 +2 = 0 [b] (49)
2c
−
12 −1+b122 = 0 [a] 1−2c−22 +2 = 0 [b] (50)
tc11+ 1− tc12−bo1ko1 = 0 [a] tc21+ 1− tc22−bo2ko2 = 0 [b] (51)
The optimal solution to this problem yields:
c∗11 =
bo1ko1
t+ 1− t[ 1
2
]−1/ c∗21 = bo2ko2
t+ 1− t[ 2
1
]−1/ (52)
c∗12 =
[
1
2
]−1/
c∗11 c
∗
22 =
[
2
1
]−1/
c∗21 
∗ = 0 (53)
In Case A it is assumed 1 > 0, from equation [49] [a] and [b]:
1 = 1c−11 −b121−1c−21 > 0 (54)
Substituting c∗11 and c
∗
21 in the expression for 1, the following condition on
b12 for this case to hold is obtained:
b12 < blim =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
bo1ko1
[
t+ 1− t
(
2
1
)−1/]
bo2ko2
[
t+ 1− t
(
1
2
)−1/]
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
−
1
1−1
(55)
Similarly it is assumed ∗ = 0, that means L

≤ 0
L

≤ ko2b11−ko2b1b12−bo22 ≤ 0 (56)
Substituting 1 = 1c−11 −b121−1c−21 and 2 =−1−1c−21 in the above
expression, the condition on ko1, for this case to hold is obtained:
1≥ko1≥
[
bo21−1
b11
]−1/
bo2
[
t+1−t
(
1
2
)−1/]
[
bo21−1
b11
]−1/
bo2
[
t+1−t
(
1
2
)−1/]+bo1
[
t+1−t
(
2
1
)−1/] = k¯
(57)
If the optimal level of the initial investment is above this limit value (k¯)
there is no liquidation in the optimal solution.
24
Banks Increase Welfare 227
CASE B: 1 = 0∗ = 0
The F.O.C. in this case are:
1c
−
11 +b122 = 0 [a] 1−1c−21 +2 = 0 [b] (58)
2c
−
12 +b122 = 0 [a] 1−2c−22 +2 = 0 [b] (59)
tc21+ 1− tc22−bo2ko2− bo1ko1− tc11− 1− tc12	b12 = 0 (60)
and the optimal solution is:
c˜∗12 =
[1
2
]−1/
c˜∗11 c˜
∗
11 =
[2
1
b˜12
]−1/
c˜∗21
c˜∗21 =
bo1ko1b˜12 +bo2ko2
t
[
1+
(2
1
)−1/ + b˜ −112 ]+ 1− t[( 21 )−1/ +b
−1

12
] c˜∗22 = [21
]−1/
c˜∗21 ˜
∗ = 0
(61)
In Case B it is assumed 1 = 0, or equivalently:
tc∗11+ 1− tc∗12 ≤ bo1ko1 (62)
Substituting the optimal consumption levels, the following expression for the
random return is obtained:
b12 ≥ blim =
{
bo1ko1
[
t+ 1− t( 2
1
)−1/]
bo2ko2
[
t+ 1− t( 1
2
)−1/]
}−
1
1−1
(63)
CASE C: 1 > 0∗ > 0
The equations to be solved are the ones given by equation [48] and the
optimal solution is:
c∗21 =
bo2bo1ko1+b1ko2{
t+ 1− t[ 1
2
]−1/}[ 1
b1
]−1/
b
−1

o2 +b1
{
t+ 1− t[ 2
1
]−1/} (64)
c∗11 =
[
bo21−1
b11
]−1/
c∗21 c
∗
22 =
[
2
1
]−1/
c∗21 c
∗
12 =
[
1
2
]
c∗11 (65)
0 < ∗ = tc
∗
11+ 1− tc∗12−bo1ko1
b1ko2
< 1 (66)
In this case, it is assumed a value for ∗ > 0, that is, substituting c∗11 and c
∗
12
in the expression for ∗, the condition on ko1 for this case to be satisfied is
obtained:
ko1 <
[
bo21−1
b11
]−1/
bo2
[
t+ 1− t( 1
2
)−1/]
[
bo21−1
b11
]−1/
bo2
[
t+ 1− t( 1
2
)−1/]+bo1[t+ 1− t( 21 )−1/
] = k¯ (67)
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Second-step Solution
The second step is the solution to the expression:
max
ko1ko2
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∫ blim
bmin
U ∗Af b12db12+
∫ bmax
blim
U ∗Bf b12db12 if ko1 ≥ k¯∫ bmax
bmin
U ∗Cf b12db12 if ko1 < k¯
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (68)
(69)
s.t ko1+ko2 = ko (70)
Then, if 0≤ ko1 < k¯ :
max
ko1
∫ bmax
bmin
U ∗Cf b12db12 →
∫ bmax
bmin
U ∗C
ko1
f b12db12 = 0 (71)
That is, if U
∗C
ko1
> 0 in the interval bmin bmax	 , the maximum is reached in
k¯. The proof is given by:
U ∗C
ko1
= t
[
c∗11
− c∗11
ko1
+1c∗21−
c∗21
ko1
]
+1−t
[
c∗12
− c∗12
ko1
+2c∗22−
c∗22
ko1
]
(72)
where:
c∗21
ko1
= bo2bo1−b1{
t+ 1− t[ 1
2
]−1/}[ 1
b1
]−1/
b
−1

o2 +b1
{
t+ 1− t[ 2
1
]−1/} (73)
c∗11
ko1
=
[bo21−1
b11
]−1/ c∗21
ko1
c∗22
ko1
=
[
2
1
]−1/
c∗21
ko1
c∗12
ko1
=
[
1
2
]−1/
c∗11
ko1
(74)
By assumption b1 < bo1 and therefore,
U ∗C
ko1
> 0 which implies k∗o1 ≥ k¯, this
means that, the optimal solution falls always in Cases A and B, with no liquidation
of the long-term asset.
Appendix B: Second Best Allocation
The second best allocation is a solution to the following problem:
max
c˜ij ko1ko2˜
EtUc˜11 c˜211+ 1− tUc˜12 c˜222	 (75)
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s.t ko1+ko2 = ko = 1
tc˜11+ 1− tc˜12 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
tc˜21+ 1− tc˜22 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜111− tc˜12	
˜≤ 1
c˜ij ≥ 0 (76)
˜≥ 0
ko1 ≥ 0
ko2 ≥ 0
I.C. Constraints
The FOCS are the following ones:
t1c
−
11 −1t+ tb122+c−11 41
−
{[(
1−2
2
)−1/ b−1/12 c21+bg12c11
b
]−(1−2
2
)−1/
2
b
g
12
b
+
[
c21+b12c11
b
]−
1−2
b12
b
}
5 = 0 if c11 > 0 (77)
t1−1c−21 + t2+ 1−1c−21 4
−
{[(
1−2
2
)−1/ b−1/12 c21+bg12c11
b
]−(1−2
2
)−1/
2
b−1/12
b
+
[
c21+b12c11
b
]− 1−2
b
}
5 = 0 if c21 > 0 (78)
1− t2c−12 −11− t+ 1− tb122+c−12 25
−
{[(
1−1
1
)−1/ b−1/12 c22+bg12c12
a
]−(1−1
1
)−1/ bg12
a
1
+
[
c22+b12c12
a
]−
1−1
b12
a
}
4 = 0 if c12 > 0 (79)
1− t1−2c−22 + 1− t2+ 1−2c−22 5
−
{[(
1−1
1
)−1/ b−1/12 c22+bg12c12
a
]−(1−1
1
)−1/ b−1/12
a
1
+
[
c22+b12c12
a
]− 1−1
a
}
4 = 0 if c22 > 0 (80)
ko2b11−ko2b1b12−bo22−3 = 0 if  > 0
tc11+ 1− tc12−bo1ko1−ko2b1 = 0 if 1 > 0
tc21+ 1− tc22− 1−bo2ko2− ko2b1+bo1ko1
−tc11− 1− tc12	b12 = 0 ∀ 2
1−= 0 if 3 > 0
(81)
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{
1c
1−
11 +1−1c1−21 −1
[(
1−1
1
)−1/ b−1/12 c22+bg12c12
a
]1−
−1−1
[
c22+b12c12
a
]1−}
1− = 0
if 4 > 0 (82){
2c
1−
12 +1−2c1−22 −2
[(
1−2
2
)−1/ b−1/12 c21+bg12c11
b
]1−
−1−2
[
c21+b12c11
b
]1−}
1− = 0
if 5 > 0 (83)
and where:
g = −1

a= 1+bg12
(
1−1
1
)−1/
b = 1+bg12
(
1−2
2
)−1/
(84)
Appendix C: Hellwig’s Case
The second best allocation is obtained as a solution to the following problem:
max
c˜1 c˜2ko1ko2 ˜
EtUc˜1+ 1− tUc˜2	 (85)
s.t ko1+ko2 = ko
tc˜1 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
1− tc˜2 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜1	
c˜1b˜12 ≤ c˜2
˜≤ 1 (86)
c˜i ≥ 0
˜≥ 0
ko1 ≥ 0
ko2 ≥ 0
First-step Solution
In a first step, ko1 and ko2 are considered as exogenous parameters to the model
and the optimal consumption levels and liquidation policy are determined. The
problem to be solved becomes the following one:
max
c˜1 c˜2 ˜
EtUc˜1+ 1− tUc˜2	 (87)
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s.t tc˜1 ≤ bo1ko1+b1˜ko2
1− tc˜2 = bo21− ˜ko2+ b˜12bo1ko1+b1˜ko2− tc˜1	
c˜1b˜12 ≤ c˜2 (88)
˜≤ 1
c˜i ≥ 0
˜≥ 0
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
tc−1 −1t+ tb122−3b12 = 0 if c1 > 0
1− tc−2 + 1− t2+3 = 0 if c2 > 0
ko2b11−ko2b1b12−bo22−3 = 0 if  > 0
bo1ko1+ko2b1− tc1 = 0 if 1 > 0
1− tc2− 1−bo2ko2− ko2b1+bo1ko1− tc1	b12 = 0 ∀ 2
c2−b12c1 = 0 if 3 > 0
1−= 0 if 4 > 0
(89)
The following cases may be considered:
CASE A: 1 > 03 = 0∗ = 0
In this case the optimal solution corresponds to the first best solution given
by equations [5] and [6](where 1 = 1 and 2 = 0)16:
c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1
t
c˜∗2 =
bo2ko2
1− t (90)
This solution is incentive compatible as long as c1b12 ≤ c2. Substituting the
optimal consumption levels in the above expression, the following condition for
this case to hold is obtain, that is, b12 ≤ b∗2 = tbo2ko21−tbo1ko1
Similarly, it is assumed ∗ = 0, that means L

≤ 0
L

≤ b11−b1b122+bo22 ≤ 0 (91)
Substituting 1 = c−1 + b122 and 2 = −c−2 in the above expression, the
condition on b1, for this case to hold is obtained: b1 ≤ b¯1 = 
bo2ko2
1−t 	
−
bo2

bo1ko1
t 	
− .
16 Notice that in this case blim =.
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CASE B: 1 = 03 > 0∗ = 0
The optimal solution to this case yields:
c˜∗1 =
bo2ko2
b˜12
+bo1ko1 c˜∗2 = bo2ko2b˜12+bo1ko1 (92)
Similarly, this case is satisfied when tc1 ≤ bo1ko1. Substituting the value of c∗1
in the above expression the condition for this case to hold is obtained, that is:
b12 ≥ b∗2 .
Finally, it is also assumed ∗ = 0, so the same condition as in the previous
case would be obtained.
CASE C: 1 > 0 3 = 0 ∗ > 0
The optimal solution in this case yields:
c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1+ko2b1bo2
tbo2+ 1− tb1
[
bo2
b1
]1/ c˜∗2 =
[
bo2
b1
]1/
c∗1 (93)
and ∗ = tc∗1−bo1ko1
b1ko2
This case is satisfied as long as c1b12 ≤ c2. Substituting the optimal con-
sumption levels in the above expression, the condition for this case to hold is
obtained, i.e, b12 ≤ b∗∗2 =  bo2b1 	
1/
CASE D: 1 > 0 3 > 0∗ > 0
Finally, the optimal solution in this case is:
c˜∗1 =
bo1ko1
bo2
b1
+bo2ko2
t
[
bo2
b1
]+ 1− tb˜12 c˜∗2 = b˜12c∗1 (94)
and ∗ = tc∗1−bo1ko1
b1ko2
This case is satisfied if b12 ∈ b∗∗2  b∗2.
The limit value b∗2 is obtained by equalizing 
∗ = 0, in the above solution.
Second-step Solution:
Finally, the optimal levels of the initial investments are obtained as a solution
to the following problem:
max
ko1ko2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∫ b∗2
bmin
U ∗Af b12db12+
∫ bmax
b∗2
U ∗Bf b12db12 if b1 ≤ b¯1
∫ b∗∗2
bmin
U ∗Cf b12db12+
∫ b∗2
b∗∗2
U ∗Df b12db12
+ ∫ bmax
b∗2
U ∗Bf b12db12 if b1 > b¯1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (95)
s.t ko1+ko2 = ko (96)
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